This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a diØ culty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More-over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have...

In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-ceiver could form over that set....

Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest...

In models of non-deterministic contest, players exert irreversible effort in order to increase their probability of winning a prize. The most prominent functional form of the win probability in the literature is the so-called "logitʺ contest success function. We provide a simple...