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Should auctions be transparent?
Bergemann, Dirk; Hörner, Johannes - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668234
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Information in mechanism design
Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003293019
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The design and price of information
Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Smolin, Alex - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524496
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Revenue guarantee equivalence
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919128
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First price auctions with general information structures : implications for bidding and revenue
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619425
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Optimal auction design in a common value model
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619428
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Information design : a unified perspective
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011639786
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Dynamic mechanism design : an introduction
Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011732676
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First price auctions with general information structures : implications for bidding and revenue
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011347370
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Information and market power
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011347376