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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453248

Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods

Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28

The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328

Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation : experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22

joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity … voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a … choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771301

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730

The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi - 2013

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742003

An experiment on the Nash program : comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022

We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252966

The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022 - Revised August 2022

We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252972

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Mantilla, César; Sethi, Rajiv - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 299-317

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316535

Determinants of equilibrium selection in network formation : an experiment

Hoyer, Britta; Rosenkranz, Stephanie - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/89, pp. 1-25

Theoretical models on network formation focus mostly on the stability and efficiency of equilibria, but they cannot deliver an understanding of why specific equilibrium networks are selected or whether they are all actually reachable from any starting network. To study factors affecting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014878