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The Market for liars : reputation and auditor honesty

McLennan, Andrew (contributor); Park, In-Uck (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a “two-tier equilibrium” in which “reputable …” auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while “disreputable” auditors accept bribes because … even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001783349

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

Reputation concerns in risky experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2019

We develop a general model, with the exponential bandit as a special case, in which high-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success but also learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model in which the single-crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024759

Signaling vision : knowing when to quit

Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2024

types quit continuously. The reputation dynamics may exhibit non-monotonicity, with agents who quit either very early or … very late carrying a higher reputation than do agents who quit near the optimal time for low types. Our analysis offers a … unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015195156

Information feedback in a dynamic tournament

Aoyagi, Masaki (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents’ effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents’ effort incentive through the use of a feedback...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001763125

Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication

Aoyagi, Masaki (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674856

Minority vs. majority : an experimental study of standardized bids

Pintér, Ágnes (contributor); … - 2008

Due to its simplicity the plurality voting system is frequently used to choose a common representative or project. Nevertheless it may fail to provide a socially efficient decision as a majority can outvote any minority even if the majority’s gain does not compensate the loss suffered by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720837

Mutual knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game

Takamiya, Koji (contributor); Tanaka, Akira (contributor) - 2006

This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321328

Optimal sales schemes against interdependent buyers

Aoyagi, Masaki (contributor) - 2005

This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can also choose the timing of a trade with each buyer endowed with private information about the seller’s good. A buyer’s valuation of the good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers’ private signals, and is affected by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003246484

Vickerey allocation rule with income effect

Saitoh, Hiroki (contributor); … - 2005

We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003246504