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Nonrenewable resources, strategic behavior and the hotelling rule : an experiment

Veldhuizen, Roel van; Sonnemans, Joep - 2011

This study uses the methods of experimental economics to investigate possible causes for the failure of the Hotelling rule for nonrenewable resources. We argue that as long as resource stocks are high enough, producers may choose to (partially) ignore the dynamic component of their production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382748

Corporate social responsibility by joint agreement

Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter; Treuren, Leonard - 2021

Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces firms to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591411

R&D cooperatives and market collusion : a global dynamic approach

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian … - 2016

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520481

R&D cooperatives and market collusion : a global dynamic approach

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian … - 2017

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133-1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602548

Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies

Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015

We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors ́actions on cartel stability and firms ́incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532614

Assessing autonomous algorithmic collusion : Q-learning under short-run price commitments

Klein, Timo - 2018 - Revision: September 2018

A novel debate within competition policy and regulation circles is whether autonomous machine learning algorithms may learn to collude on prices. We show that when fims face short-run price commitments, independent Q-learning (a simple but well-established self-learning algorithm) learns to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011869980

In defense of trusts : R&D cooperation in global perspective

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian … - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191415

Artificial collusion : examining supracompetitive pricing by Q-learning algorithms

Boer, Arnoud V. den; Meylahn, Janusz M.; Schinkel, … - 2022

We examine recent claims that a particular Q-learning algorithm used by competitors 'autonomously' and systematically learns to collude, resulting in supracompetitive prices and extra profits for the firms sustained by collusive equilibria. A detailed analysis of the inner workings of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013375353

Market structure and advance selling

Möller, Marc; Watanabe, Makoto - 2016

When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446893

Compensatory public good provision by a private cartel

Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter; Toth, Lukas - 2019 - Revision: March 2020

environment, their agreements may be exempted from cartel law. To qualify, the public benefits must compensate consumers for … higher prices of the private good. We study the balancing involved in assessing a public interest-cartel in a public goods … Samuelson condition. The cartel will provide minimal public good for maximal overcharges. Nevertheless it is typically not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149732