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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2009 - Revised: April 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals … games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378808

Incentivizing creativity : a large-scale experiment with tournaments and gifts

Bradler, Christiane; Neckermann, Susanne; Warnke, Arne - 2016

incentives and wage gifts on creativity. We find that tournaments substantially increase creative output, with no evidence for … complex tasks. Our findings provide a rationale for the frequent use of tournaments when seeking to motivate creative output. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479746

The degradation of distorted performance measures

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049

The interaction between explicit and relational incentives : an experiment

Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - 2009

We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378080

Tournament incentives in the field : gender differences in the workplace

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Sol, Joeri; … - 2012

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378827

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949

Learning from praise : evidence from a field experiment with teachers

Cotofan, Maria - 2019

Non-monetary incentives such as praise are common-place, but their effects on workers performing cognitively-complex tasks remain largely unknown. I expand the teacher incentive literature through a field experiment measuring how repeated public praise for the best teachers impacts teacher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012129324

Team incentives, social cohesion, and performance : a natural field experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Onemu, Okemena Abraham - 2019

We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain with 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance depends on a team's social cohesion. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026123

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185