Similar Search Results

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2009 - Revised: April 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals … games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378808

The degradation of distorted performance measures

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949

Biased supervision

Delfgaauw, Josse; Souverijn, Michiel - 2014

When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to subjective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-supervisor-agent model in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395075

Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay : a field experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2013

We conduct a field experiment among 189 stores of a retail chain to study dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores from the control group over the course of four weeks....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382591

Are CEOs incentivized to avoid corporate taxes? : empirical evidence on managerial bonus contracts

Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2014

In this paper, we test empirically whether there is a relationship between corporate income taxes and CEO bonus payments. Using Compustat and ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2010, we find mixed results. Looking at the whole sample, the average bonus contract rewards tax savings excessively in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346227

Testing for distortions in performance measures : an application to residual income based measures like economic value added

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2014

Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350010

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2006 - This version: 8 August 2006

While most papers_new on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349704

The impact of naïve advice and observational learning in beauty-contest games

Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - 2007 - This version: January 24, 2007

We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350357