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This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
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worker buys an insurance, which gives a constant income and retirement benefits in exchange for the total output. The level …
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We formally link insurance markets with product markets and identify a demand effect of insurance: if risk …-averse consumers can buy insurance against possible product failure, there will be some additional consumers that buy the product … have a higher willingness to pay if they can also buy insurance. But a higher price causes those consumers to leave the …
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Firms hiring fresh graduates face uncertainty on the future productivity of workers. Theory suggests that starting … wages reflect this, with lower pay for greater uncertainty. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education … as an indicator of the unobserved heterogeneity that employers face. We find solid evidence that starting wages are lower …
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the insurance sector. The downside risk of insurers is explicitly modelled by common and idiosyncratic risk factors. Since … results point to a relatively low insurance sector wide risk. Dependence among insurers is higher than among reinsurers. …
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