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Exploitation and cooperation in networks

Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2004

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335196

Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability

Kopányi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190988

Denial and alarmism in collective action problems

Förster, Manuel; Weele, Joël J. van der - 2018

information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801387

The economics of altruistic punishment and the demise of cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - 2005

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems … mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to … maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343948

Imitation of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games with some local interaction

Janssen, Maarten C. W. - 2000

, the less likely cooperation will be. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303319

Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113

Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games : ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193

Power and the privilege of clarity : an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160

The economics of altruistic punishment and the demise of cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002982884

The unique-lowest sealed-bid auction

Houba, Harold; Laan, Dinard van der; Veldhuizen, Dirk - 2008

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374396