In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods … and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the … question of the value added of letting the sourcing process consist of both an auction and a negotiation stage, theoretically …

the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience …Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear. …

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous … bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except … Internet auctions. …

In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that determine the sequence of service to queued … mechanism than the customer-initiated auction. When voting between the two auctions, participants tended to favor the server … customers. In the server-initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and … the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and …

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first …-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we … observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both …

Aftermarket social welfare is largely determined by a procurement auction design. Auctions select firms for operating … aftermarket social welfare generated by first-price and second-price procurement auctions. It reveals that the social welfare …-price procurement auctions are welfare-equivalent. When it increases (or decreases) with price, first-price (or second-price) auctions …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …