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Theory of decisions by intra-dimensional comparisons

Tserenjigmid, Gerelt - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 326-338

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549108

An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

Bognar, Katalin; Börgers, Tilman; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 1056-1073

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549309

Dynamically consistent voting rules

Chandrasekher, Madhav - In: Journal of economic theory 160 (2015), pp. 175-187

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549356

Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains

Reffgen, Alexander - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 349-383

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525275

Constrained implementation

Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele - In: Journal of economic theory 183 (2019), pp. 546-567

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131373

Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Journal of economic theory 182 (2019), pp. 25-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133294

From equals to despots : the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information

Carrasco, Vinicius; Fuchs, William; Fukuda, Satoshi - In: Journal of economic theory 182 (2019), pp. 402-432

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133315

Vote-motivated candidates

Sorokin, Constantine; Zakharov, Alexei - In: Journal of economic theory 176 (2018), pp. 232-254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980851

Coalition-proof full efficient implementation

Safronov, Mikhail - In: Journal of economic theory 177 (2018), pp. 659-677

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012025739

An experimental study of voting with costly delay

Kwiek, Maksymilian; Marreiros, Helia; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2015

A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011336977