Showing 1 - 10 of 16
We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382050
case of delegation. On the other hand, any acquired information is better aggregated in case of delegation, where experts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549435
Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 72 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531912
While strong social ties help individuals cope with missing institutions, trade is essentially limited to those who are part of the social network. We examine what makes the decision to trust a stranger different from the decision to trust a member of a given social network (a friend), by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699454
When groups face difficult problems, the voice of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a 'naturally noisy' setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the 'expert's voice is lost' to such a degree that it is in fact optimal for all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012257743
This paper investigates experimentally how the inclination to cheat changes when agents report the result of multiple realizations of a (private information) stochastic event rather than a single outcome. Extreme outcomes clearly signal opportunistic behavior with multiple realizations. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290698
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140235
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others' trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402873
Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011415111