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Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the … literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that … also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035706
Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems. However, little is known about the effect of leadership in group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015190589
Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212997
. The two dimensions provide an opportunity to trade off one policy over another to make the lobbying opposition less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012372755
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751
We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012295566
Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government's support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412469
We consider rent-seeking contests between and within two equal-sized groups. Each group adopts one of three sequences: first internal then external contest, first external then internal contest, and simultaneous internal and external contests. Groups cannot unilaterally postpone a contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015162741
We examine how inequality in the endowment of secure wealth, mediated through voluntary public good provision, affects rent-seeking within and between groups. We model a scenario where two communities, each internally differentiated into rich, intermediate and poor segments, contest one another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012703084
We model a rent-seeking contest among two "identity ideologues", differentially located along a uni-dimensional identity continuum, and a "mercenary", who can choose any location in-between. The contest jointly awards an identity-relevant good ("religion") and an identity-irrelevant good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015064493