In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …

be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …

The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where …. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a sequential menu of delegation sets where the agent first picks a … delegation set and then chooses an action within this set. For the uniform{quadratic case, we characterize when sequential …

principle, the optimal contract under non-verifiability is derived by employing the theory of communication equilibrium. …

task is not routine or can not be done by a robot. Using a framework of incomplete contract, we show that allocation of …, and the relationship between the resources. Monitoring is then introduced to fine tune value of delegation. …

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not …

employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave …

In this paper, firms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in … the contract length affects the firms' rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract … assignment stage, as the firms value the contract higher. On the other hand, the contract has to be assigned less often, which of …