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Which reputations does a brand owner need? : evidence from trade mark opposition

Graevenitz, Georg von - 2007

At least two: the reputation of their brand and a reputation for being tough on imitators of this brand. Sustaining a … brand requires both investment in its reputation amongst consumers and the defence of the brand against followers that … that brand owners can benefit from a reputation for tough opposition to trade mark applications. Such a reputation induces …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343935

Plaintiffs exploiting plaintiffs

Stremitzer, Alexander - 2008

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383020

Double-sided moral hazard, efficiency wages and litigation

Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - 2007

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383025

Opportunistic termination

Stremitzer, Alexander - 2008

If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to contract, European and US warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use non-conformity as a pretext for getting rid of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365843

Reliance investments, expectation damages and hidden information

Schweizer, Urs - 2006

A setting of reliance investments is explored where one of the parties to a contract obtains private information concerning his utility or cost function that remains hidden to the other party and to courts. As a consequence, it will be a difficult task to award expectation damages corrrectly to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365891

Expectation damages, divisible contracts, and bilateral investment

Ohlendorf, Susanne - 2008

This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383019

Standard breach remedies, quality thresholds, and cooperative investments

Stremitzer, Alexander - 2008

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343923

Cooperative investments induced by contract law

Schweizer, Urs - 2004

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: This paper revisits the economic analysis of contract law for a setting of cooperative investments. While Che and Chung (1999) have shown that expectation damages perform rather poorly, the present paper argues that this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343972

On and off contract remedies

Brooks, Richard; Stremitzer, Alexander - 2009

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) 'affirm' the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909321

A theory of Crowdfunding : a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard

Strausz, Roland - 2015 - This version: November 14, 2015

Crowdfunding provides the innovation that, before the investment, entrepreneurs contract with consumers. Under demand uncertainty, this improves a screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Focusing on the trade-off between value screening and moral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383014