This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and...

This paper gives an account of events, and explains some systematic reasons of the UMTS auction flop in Switzerland. Apart from general market developments, which could not have been anticipated, we argue that auction design which was introduced in England and adopted in Switzerland and...

Dieser Beitrag informiert über die Bedeutung von Auktionen im Wirtschaftsleben, über Vor- und Nachteile gängiger Auktionsregeln sowie über grundlegende Konzepte und Ergebnisse der Theorie nichtkooperativer Auktionsspiele. Besonderes Gewicht hat die anschauliche Darstellung und kritische...

Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag kommentiert Güths axiomatische Begründung der Zweit-Preis-Auktion. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch Güths umfangreiche Analyse der Lambda-Auktion durch eine einfache und anschaulich interpretierbare Lösung ersetzt. -- auctions ; procurement

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders’ valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders’...

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and...

We analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects in the form of stochastic economies or diseconomies of scale. We show that economies give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices, whereas the converse is not generally true. Moreover,...

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...