This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Interaction neighborhood to obtain their payoff. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neighbors in another neighborhood- the Propagation...

In 1987, I wrote a paper (Binmore [14]) that questioned the rationality of the backward induction principle in finite games of perfect information. Since that time, a small literature has grown up in which Antonelli and Bicchieri [1], Ben-Porath [9], Bicchieri [10,11], Bonanno [21,22], Pettit...

With existing technology, it is already possible for personal agents to schedule meetings for thier users, to write the small print of an agrement and for agents to search the Internet for the cheapest price. But srious negotiation cranks the difficulty of the problem up several notches. In this...

The Paradox of the Absent-Minded Driver is used in the literature to draw attention to the inadequacy of Savage's theory of subjective probability when its underlying epistomological assumptions fail to be satisfied. This note suggests that the paradox is less telling when the uncertainties...

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...

In 1987, I wrote a paper that questioned the rationality of the backward induction principle in finite games of perfect information. Since that time, a small literature has grown up in which Antonelli and Bicchieri , Ben-Porath, Bicchieri, Bonanno, Pettit and Sugden [28], Reny [30], Samet [32],...

This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...

This paper suggests that rights are best seen as being part of the description of a social state rather than as constituents of the mechanism by means of which society selects a social state. A theory of this kind is outlined in which a social state is modeled as an equilibrium in the game of...