Typically, work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable. This paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem. It is shown that the firm will choose to...

We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which...

The authors study a differentiated industry in which two firms compete by offering intervals of qualities to heterogenous consumers. They establish conditions which, for perfect competition and monopoly, imply that different consumers choose different qualities. Under these conditions, they show...

The authors provide existence proofs and characterization results for the multidimensional version of the multiproduct monopolist problem of M. Mussa and S, Rosen (1978). These results a are also directly applicable to the multidimensional nonlinear pricing problems studied by R. Wilson (1993)...

We study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which a risk-neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to adjustment costs. In the optimal...