In their analysis of strategic information transmission, Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982) showed the existence of partition equilibria (Theorem 1). Although the theorem itself is correct, the proof contains some incorrect statements. We present a counter‐example and provide a correct...

The authors examine discounted repeated games where players privately observe different signals. A leading example is secret price cutting; a firm cannot directly observe rival firms' price cutting but its own sales can imperfectly indicate what is going on. The characterization of equilibria in...

An evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with stochastic mutations is analyzed. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked to their current relative success, but mutuation, perturbing the system from its deterministic evolution, are present as well. The focus is on...

Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has focused on public strategies: strategies that depend solely on the history of publicly observable signals. This paper sheds light on the role of private strategies: strategies that depend not only on public...

This paper examines the problem of measuring intellectual influence based on data on citations between scholarly publications. We follow an axiomatic approach and find that the properties of invariance to reference intensity, weak homogeneity, weak consistency, and invariance to splitting of...

We study how professional players and college students play zero-sum two-person strategic games in a laboratory setting. We first ask professionals to play a 2 × 2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation that they face in their natural environment. Consistent with...