The authors consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences. They characterize the set of allocation rules that are compatible with individual incentives or, in other words, the set of strategy-proof...

We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to...

Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information. We provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent...

The decentralization of decision-making is analyzed when agents may have information that is incomplete and possibly exclusive. Theorems provide conditions under which there exists a mechanism whose Bayesian equilibria coincide with a desired collection of social choice functions. The first...

The authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences via Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The main result is that if there are at least three agents in society, then any correspondence that satisfies no veto power is implementable unless...

This paper studies the problem of implementation of allocation rules in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The concept of equilibrium used is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The authors show that a condition called Bayesian monotonicity is...