An allocation for an exchange economy with smooth preferences is shown to be Walrasian if there is a set of net trades that is closed under addition, contains the negations of net trades that would improve any agent's final bundle, and is such that each agent's final bundle is weakly preferred...

Consider nonempty finite pure strategy sets S[subscript 1], . . . , S[subscript n], let S = S[subscript 1] times . . . times S[subscript n], let Omega be a finite space of "outcomes," let Delta(Omega) be the set of probability distributions on Omega, and let theta: S approaches Delta(Omega) be a...

Fix finite pure strategy sets <formula format="inline"> <simplemath>_S1 <roman>,</roman>… <roman>,</roman>_Sn </simplemath> </formula>, and let <formula format="inline"> <simplemath>S&equals;_S1×&ctdot;×_Sn </simplemath> </formula>. In our model of a random game the agents' payoffs are statistically independent, with each agent's payoff uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in <openface>R</openface>-super-S. For given nonempty <formula format="inline"> <simplemath>_T1⊂_S1 <roman>,</roman>… <roman>,</roman>_Tn⊂_Sn </simplemath> </formula> we give a...

We study a principal–agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire...

The aim of this paper is to explain the fact that certain properties of binary relations are frequently observed in natural language while others do not appear at all. Three features of binary relation are studied: (1) The ability to use the relation to indicate nameless elements. (2) The...

The authors study the Nash equilibria of a two-person, infinitely-repeated game in which players' preferences depend on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. The model considered is that of A. Rubinstein (1986). Necessary conditions on the structure of the...