It has been emphasized that when contracts are incomplete (e.g., because some relevant variables are not verifiable by outsiders), the possibility of contract negotiation may prevent achieving desirable allocations that could be implemented otherwise. The authors analyze a situation where...

The authors present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that have as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility case, the...

For every range of admissible incomes, the authors characterize the class of Engel curves with the property that if an economy has, first, a price independent distribution of income and, second, preferences which are identical across consumers and generate Engel curves in the class, then the...

Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition). It is proved that...