Showing 1 - 10 of 13
We provide a nonlinear characterization of the macroeconomic impact of microeconomic productivity shocks in terms of reduced‐form nonparametric elasticities for efficient economies. We also show how microeconomic parameters are mapped to these reduced‐form general equilibrium elasticities....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012097976
A ruler who does not identify with a social group, whether on religious, ethnic, cultural, or socioeconomic grounds, is confronted with a trade‐off between taking advantage of the out‐group population's eagerness to maintain its identity and inducing it to “comply” (conversion, quitting,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637166
A principal has private information that directly affects her agent's payoff (i.e., "common values" obtains). The authors analyze their relationship as a three-stage game: (1) the principal proposes a contract; (2) the agent accepts or rejects; and (3) the contract is executed. They show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702147
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702155
This paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702460
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach, and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring, and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702467
The authors analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three-stage game: contract proposal, acceptance/refusal, and contract execution. They assume that the information does not directly affect the agent's payoff (private values). Equilibrium exists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231706
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170354
The authors introduce a class of alternating-move, infinite-horizon models of duopoly. The timing captures the presence of short-run commitment s. They apply this framework to a natural monopoly in which costs are so large that at most one firm can make a profit. The firms install short-run...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332389
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332746