Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We analyze a cheap talk game, à la Crawford and Sobel, in a multidimensional state and policy space. A feature of the multidimensional state space is that communication on one dimension often reveals information on others. We show how this feature imposes bounds on communication. Copyright The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332790
In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one-dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702068
When two parties have different prior beliefs about some future event, they can realize gains through speculative trade. Can these gains be realized when the parties' prior beliefs are not common knowledge? We examine a simple example in which two parties having heterogeneous prior beliefs,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231293
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011026292
A concept of an egalitarian solution is developed within the framework of cooperative game theory. The solution is designed to capture the interplay between social values (in this case, egalitarianism) and individual behavior. Both the final outcomes possible coalitional deviations are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332552
Suppose that the authors are interested in the distribution of a set of characteristics over a population. They study a precise sense in which this distribution can be said to be polarized and provide a theory of measurement. Polarization, as conceptualized here, is closely related to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702446
We develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which income distributions can be described using density functions. The main theorem uniquely characterizes a class of polarization measures that fits into what we call the "identity-alienation" framework, and simultanously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231488
A principal and an agent enter into a sequence of agreements. The principal faces an interim participation constraint at each date, but can commit to the current agreement; in contrast, the agent has the opportunity to renege on the current agreement. We study the time structure of agreement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332195