The main result of this paper characterizes voting by committees. There are n voters and K objects. Voters must choose a subset of K. Voting by committees is defined by one monotone family of winning coalitions for each object; an object is chosen if it is supported by one of its winning...

Recently, attention has been given to a model of two-person bargaining in which the parties alternate making of fers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party. The p urpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process, where agents with...

An allocation for an exchange economy with smooth preferences is shown to be Walrasian if there is a set of net trades that is closed under addition, contains the negations of net trades that would improve any agent's final bundle, and is such that each agent's final bundle is weakly preferred...

The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games,...