With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all...

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an 'n'-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe - about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the...

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

An exponentially small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number T of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually rational outcome of any one-shot game can be approximated by an equilibrium...