"This paper reports an experiment conducted to evaluate a "near-continuous" variant of the posted offer trading institution, where the number of periods in a market session is increased by reducing sharply each period's maximum length. Experimental results suggest that although decisions in...

Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are...

"This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead...

"The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a "collusion incubator" environment based on a type of public, symmetrically "folded" and "item-aligned" preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the...

A theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences. For example, wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility...