This article introduces a monopolistically competitive model of foreign lending in which both explicit and implicit fixed-premium deposit insurance increase the degree to which bank participation in relending to problem debtors falls below its globally optimal level. This provides a channel for...

This paper develops an open-economy version of the Bernanke-Blinder model which indicates that sterilization efforts through increases in reserve requirements will have limited impact if viable financial alternatives to the commercial banking sector exist. I then examine the capital inflow surge...

This paper studies a banking industry subject to common and idiosyncratic shocks. We compare two types of regulatory closure rules: (1) an “absolute closure rule,” which closes banks when their asset–liability ratios fall below a given threshold, and (2) a “relative closure rule,”...

This paper reviews the Japanese experience with "put guarantees" recently offered in the sale of several failed banks. These guarantees, meant to address information asymmetry problems, are shown to create moral hazard problems of their own. In particular, the guarantees make acquiring banks...