We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1978</CitationRef>) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though...</citationref>

In this note we show that the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining theory does not hold if the number of feasible agreements is finite. It will be shown that any Pareto-efficient agreement (belonging to the finite set of feasible agreements) can be...

This note analyzes a modified version of the standard repeated-offers bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information studies in Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). The modification, which is introduced in the...

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralized market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our...