We extend the notion of the inner core of a finite economy to a large economy. We prove that competitive allocations and the core coincide with the inner core.

<Para ID="Par1">We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Nash’s axioms to determine a unique single-valued bargaining solution up to choices of bargaining powers. Specifically, we...</para>

Bertrand criticized Cournot's analysis of the competitive process, arguing that firms should be seen as playing a strategy of setting price below competitors' prices (henceforth, the Bertrand strategy) instead of a strategy of accepting the price needed to sell an optimal quantity (the Cournot...

We analyze welfare effect of information acquisition for a model of competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. We show that in the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, each agent’s gain from trade in ex ante utility decreases as more agents...