We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic theory. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

We extend the model from Tornell and Velasco [13] and Tornell and Lane [12] by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents can be heterogeneous. We show...

This paper studies a deterministic one-sector growth model with a constant returns to scale production function and endogenous labor supply. It is shown that the distribution of capital among the agents has an effect on the level of per-capita output. There exists a continuum of stationary...

We discuss an analytically tractable discrete-time dynamic game in which a finite number of players extract a renewable resource. We characterize a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the resource does not become...

A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate...

We consider a one-sector neoclassical capital accumulation model under borrowing constraints with infinitely lived heterogeneous households. Under the standard assumptions of strictly concave and time-additive utility functionals and a strictly concave production function, we show that perfect...

We show that for every discount factor rho epsilon(O,1) one can find infinitely many strictly concave discrete-time optimal growth models in reduced form which have optimal policy functions exhibiting ergodic chaos. These reduced form models are interpreted in a two-sector optimal growth setting...

We consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly. We demonstrate that optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not the same for all firms. We call this property selective penalization. Our Optimal Distortion Theorem states that the efficient tax structure requires that high cost firms pay a...