This paper provides sufficient conditions for comparing the choices of different players in games of strategic complements. The main results require a weak ordering relation on the best responses of players in the game and their constraint sets. Under additional restrictions, we can also compare...

This note reconsiders the well-known model of strategic bequest* altruistic growth, but with stochastic production satisfying a strong convexity condition: The probability that the next stock exceeds any given level is concave in investment. Existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium...

We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate...

For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii)...

This note reconsiders the well-known model of strategic bequest/altruistic growth, but with stochastic production satisfying a strong convexity condition: The probability that the next stock exceeds any given level is concave in investment. Existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium...