This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare ordering must be representable by a...

The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with...

We provide characterizations of four new rules for individual decision-making under complete uncertainty. They are what we call the min-max rule, the max-min rule, the lexicographic min-max rule and the lexicographic max-min rule. These rules provide orderings of the sets of possible outcomes...

We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that...

In this note, it is shown that a result due to Uzawa showing that the weak axiom of revealed preference together with a regularity condition implies the strong axiom of revealed preference can be derived from the regularity condition alone, if the choice function is continuous in prices and in...

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given...