If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

We consider competitive markets with asymmetric information. We define a notion of equilibrium that allows individuals to act strategically both as buyers and as sellers. In an example, the wage is common to all types of labor, and it does not reveal information concerning the skill levels of...

According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent. An “essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n})$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and a...</equationsource></inlineequation>