The private core of an economy with differential information, (Yannelis (1991)), is the set of all state-wise feasible and private information measurable allocations which cannot be dominated, in terms of ex ante expected utility functions, by state-wise feasible and private information...

In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect...

In his Nash equilibrium paper, Glicksberg states that the payoff functions are continuous. Such a function is defined on the product of mixed strategies, which are the Borel probability measures on a compactum, endowed with the product of the weak topologies. The continuity property is used in...

We show, by employing a density result for probability measures, that in games with a finite number of players and \infty-dimensional pure strategy spaces Nash equilibria can be approximated by finite mixed strategies. Given 0, each player receives an expected utility payoff /2 close to his Nash...

We point out several conceptual difficulties of the rational expectations equilibrium concept. In particular we show that such an equilibrium need not be incentive compatible and need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium . A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with...

We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge...

A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally...