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-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has commitment power to verifiably disclose contestants’ types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014497469
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370750
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) in which some players know the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993522
-order contests with complete information, in which each player’s strategy generates direct or indirect affine “spillover” effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of litigation, and a host of other contests. Copyright The Author(s) 2012 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993551
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use our results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993555
level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players …’ resources are “use it or lose it” in the sense that any resources that are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993605
We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests … bounded, limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the prize in large contests even if contestants differ. Partial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753219
We study contests where the set of players is a random variable. If it is known for certain that there will be at least …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753373
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This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593359