We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics.

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In...

<Para ID="Par1">We develop revealed preference tests for models of multi-product oligopoly, building on the work in Carvajal et al. (Econometrica 81(6):2351–2379, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2013</CitationRef>). We analyze a Cournot model with multiple goods and show that it has testable restrictions when at least one good is produced by two or more...</citationref></para>

I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

<Para ID="Par1">This paper presents a model of social capital and social network formation. The key interaction within the model is that whom an individual chooses to become friends with affects the value (social capital) of the friendship. In the model, how a player searches for and then forms friendships...</para>