In each stage of a repeated game with private monitoring, the players receive payoffs and privately observe signals which depend on the players' actions and the state of world. I show that, contrary to a widely held belief, such games admit a recursive structure. More precisely, I construct a...

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a...

This paper develops a simple “instant-response” model of strategic behavior where players can react instantly to changing circumstances, but at the same time face some inertia after changing action. The framework is used to reconsider the folk theorem and, in particular, the role of the key...

<Para ID="Par1">This paper provides assumptions for a limit Folk theorem in stochastic games with finite horizon. In addition to the asymptotic assumptions à la Dutta (J Econ Theory 66:1–32, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1995</CitationRef>) I present an additional assumption under which the Folk theorem holds in stochastic games when the horizon is...</citationref></para>

We study a strategic market game associated to an intertemporal economy with a finite horizon and incomplete markets. We demonstrate that generically, for any finite number of players, every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free stream of allocations can be approximated by...

This paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique....