A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally...

This paper deals with a private ownership production economy assuming that the commodity space is infinite-dimensional. It is first showed that the fuzzy core allocations, a concept that goes back to J.-P. Aubin, are in a one-to-one correspondence with certain core allocations of a continuum...

For a two-sided multipartner matching model where agents are given by path-independent choice functions and no quota restrictions, Blair [7] had shown that stable matchings always exist and form a lattice. However, the lattice operations were not simple and not distributive. Recently Alkan [3]...

A simple proof of Reny and Wooders' recent strengthening of Shapley's extension of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma on a closed cover of a simplex is given. The proof uses Ky Fan's coincidence theorem.

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and...