By a slight generalization of the definition of implementation (called implementation by awards), Maskin monotonicity is no more needed for Nash implementation. In fact, a weaker condition, to which we refer as almost monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for social choice...

The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash...

A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable...

This paper considers a model of (consensual) democracy where political parties engage first in electoral competition, and they share policy-making power afterward according with the votes gathered in the election. The paper uncovers the difficulties to guarantee stability in this institutional...

We characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies 'unanimity'...

We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two...

I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general sets of assumptions. I first construct a...

Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity. This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains weak versions of his other two axioms....

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...