We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and...

This paper provides conditions for the almost sure convergence of the least squares learning rule in a stochastic temporary equilibrium model, where regressions are performed on the past values of the endogenous state variable. In contrast to earlier studies, (Evans and Honkapohja, 1998; Marcent and...