We introduce a two-period economy with asymmetric information about the state of nature that occurs in the second period. Each agent is endowed with an information structure that describes her (incomplete) ability to prove whether or not a state has occurred. We show that if the number of states...

We consider a set of asymmetrically informed agents, where the information of each trader is susceptible of being altered when she becomes a member of a coalition. For this, we consider a general rule that depending on the coalition, a signal (or an information partition) is assigned to each...

In this work, we clarify the relationship between the information that an agent receives from a signal, from an experiment or from his own ability to determine the true state of nature that occurs and the information that an agent receives from a <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\sigma $$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-algebra. We show that, for...</equationsource></inlineequation>

In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities....