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Putting the other side "on notice" can induce compliance in arms control
Kilgour, D. Marc; Brams, Steven J. - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000835623
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Rational deescalation
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1985
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000708530
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Optimal deterrence
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1984
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000708559
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Deterrence by variable retaliation : a game-theoretic analysis
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1985
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000709753
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Winding down if preemption or escalation occurs : a game-theoretic analysis
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1985
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000709772
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Verification and stability : a game-theoretic analysis
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000709834
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The point of no return : a game-theoretic analysis of crisis stability
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000709850
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Notes on arms-control verification : a game-theoretic analysis
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000709885
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Threat escalation and crisis stability : a game-theoretic analysis
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000733221
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Deterrence versus defense : a game-theoretic model of star wars
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000733624