This paper examines the determinants of the decision to relocate activities abroad for firms that are located in 29 OECD countries. Our theoretical model suggests that firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role for the link between employment protection and relocation. Stricter employment...

This paper examines how employment protection legislation affects location decisions of multinationals. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we estimate an empirical model, using OECD-data on bilateral FDI-flows and employment protection indices. We find that, while an “unfavourable”...

This paper examines how trade liberalisation affects innovation, profits and welfare when firms are engaging in strategic R&D investment. We show that there are multiple equilibria including an autarky equilibrium for a range of high but non-prohibitive trade costs. At lower trade costs, only...

This paper examines how trade liberalisation affects innovation, profits and welfare in a reciprocal markets model when firms pre-commit to R&D investment. First, we show that, for a range of trade costs, there are multiple equilibria, implying that the path of trade liberalisation is not...

We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructural investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for inter-regional infrastructural externalities. Depending on the externality,...

This paper examines the trade-off between strategic investment commitment and flexibility under oligopoly. Facing demand uncertainty, firms decide whether to commit to investment early or wait until the uncertainty as been resolved. Two endogenous timing games are considered which differ in...

We study the strategic investment behaviour of oligopsonistic rivals in the labour market. Under wage competition, firms play "puppy dog" with productivityaugmenting investment and "fat cat" with supply-enhancing investment. Under employment competition, investing strategically always involves...

We introduce endogenous leadership in a game between government and firms, in which the government has short-run commitment power only and firms choose when to invest. We show that firms that delay investment in the absence of government intervention have an incentive to invest early and...

This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. When the...

We investigate whether and to what extent uniform and differentiated tax systems diverge in their propensity to create distortionary opportunistic behavoiur. The set-up in which we carry out our analysis features polluting firms that are confronted with existence a Pigovian emission tax. Firms...