This note examines firm locations in a delivered pricing model with positive production externalities. We find that, quite counter intuitively, firms will disperse rather than move closer, when production externalities are positive and reciprocal. Furthermore, we see a divergence between the...

For an even number of firms with identical transport cost, spatial Cournot competition in a circular city generates a continuum of equilibria. We establish that any transport cost differential between the firms, however small, may eliminate all the equilibria, except the partial agglomeration...

This note examines firm locations in a delivered pricing model with positive production externalities. We find that, quite counter intuitively, firms will disperse rather than move closer, when production externalities are positive and reciprocal. Furthermore, we see a divergence between the...

For an even number of firms with identical transport cost, spatial Cournot competition in a circular city generates a continuum of equilibria. We establish that any transport cost differential between the firms, however small, may eliminate all the equilibria, except the partial agglomeration...

We are the first to confirm that sufficient cost convexity in a Stackelberg model generates profitable mergers between two leaders and between two followers. Moreover, the degree of convexity required for leaders to merge is generally far smaller than that required for followers. Most...

We are the first to confirm that sufficient cost convexity in a Stackelberg model generates profitable mergers between two leaders and between two followers. Moreover, the degree of convexity required for leaders to merge is generally far smaller than that required for followers. Most...