Theoretical work starting with Stigler (1964) suggests that collusion may be difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty. Compared to equilibria in games of perfect information, trigger-strategy equilibria in this context result in lower payoffs because...

I utilize the highly disaggregate EIU CityData and present some preliminary results looking at how retail prices of two goods almost exclusively imported, bananas and virgin olive oil, are affected by import prices of these goods from another perspective, I consider how distributor margins...

Theoretical work starting with Stigler (1964) suggests that collusion may be difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty. Compared to equilibria in games of perfect information, trigger-strategy equilibria in this context result in lower payoffs because...

I utilize the highly disaggregate EIU CityData and present some preliminary results looking at how retail prices of two goods almost exclusively imported, bananas and virgin olive oil, are affected by import prices of these goods from another perspective, I consider how distributor margins...