Though government intervention is prevalent in the market for research and development (R&D), most literature has focused on the use of subsidies, patents or joint research ventures to obtain the efficient R&D investment. By using a two-stage duopoly model in which firms first choose the level...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.

A contract-based model of the endogenous determination of an organization's architecture is considered where a principal has the choice between a two- and a three-level organization. Each organizational architecture is plagued with its own specific form(s) of opportunism. We derive the...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

Using data from Nippon Professional Baseball, which is the Japanese professional baseball league, we examine the relationship between within-team salary disparity and team performance. We find that greater salary disparity tends to result in better team performance, which is the opposite of what...

This paper proposes an alternative to standard cardinal tournaments. The analysis contrasts "hybrid" cardinal tournaments to standard cardinal tournaments and piece rates. It shows that providing for partial insurance against common uncertainty via a hybrid tournament (in which the weights on...