In this note we consider a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition between firms who ignore the feedback effect of their dividend payments on demand. The outcome of this competition coincides with the perfectly competitive equilibrium solution, provided that firms have identical...

In this note, we introduce conjectural variations in a simple general oligopoly equilibrium model of a pure exchange economy. Three results are obtained. First, the price and utility levels generally increase with the value taken by conjectures. Second, when the conjectural variation takes its...

This paper studies the way market power operates under symmetric oligopoly equilibrium. Stressing the role of preferences and focusing on price manipulation, four results are obtained about asymptotic identifications (for degenerate preferences and large economies) and about welfare configurations.

In this note, we address the problem of determining which conjectural variations general equilibria are consistent in strategic multilateral exchange. We therefore consider expectations in a simple conjectural general equilibrium model of a pure exchange economy under strategic interactions....

In this note, we introduce conjectural variations in a simple general oligopoly equilibrium model of a pure exchange economy. Three results are obtained. First, the price and utility levels generally increase with the value taken by conjectures. Second, when the conjectural variation takes its...

We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive...

We study information disclosure in standard auctions where bidders preferences are horizontally differentiated, whose valuations depend on the matching between the product attribute and their preferences. The seller may reveal product information in the form of partition prior to the auction....

A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing buyers, her...

This paper examines the effect of demand uncertainty on the properties of the first period contract between a lender and the incumbent, when there is a threat of entry. The main findings are that unlike the cost uncertainty case, entry has no effect on the incumbent's incentives and it leads the...

This paper makes three contributions: (1) A competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. Specifically, given any profile of incentive compatible indirect contracting mechanisms, there exists an incentive compatible...