Showing 1 - 10 of 16
-Douglas preferences the core of the economy does not con-verge to the Lindahl solution when the number of agents goes to infinity. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005417008
game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and … sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize … axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010726673
and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737503
Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a … each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core … allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371382
In this paper we study the equity core (Selten, 1978) and compare it with the core. A payoff vector is in the equity … core if no coalition can divide its value among its members proportionally to a given weight system and, in this way, give … more to each member than the amount he or she receives in the payoff vector. We show that the equity core is a compact …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747091
that a simple majority rule required to break global cooperation guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836007
For simple economic models of transfrontier pollution, Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) have offered a formula for transfers to sustain international cooperation on a voluntary basis and which deter coalitionnal free-riding under some reasonable behaviours of countries not in the coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836166
For simple economic models of transfrontier pollution, Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) have offered a formula for transfers to sustain international cooperation on a voluntary basis and which deter coalitionnal free-riding under some reasonable behaviours of countries not in the coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094644
-sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with competitive prices of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008625861
We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results to the case of 2 x m or m x 2 assignment games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672354