We analyze and evaluate the power of each member state of the European Union according to the different relations between them. To do that, we use power indices introduced by Andjiga and Courtin (2010) for games in which the players are organized into a priori coalition configurations. As a...

This paper proves the existence of non-empty cores for directed network problems with quotas and for those combinatorial allocation problems which permit only exclusive allocations.

The spatial voting approach is extended to account for the existence of a loyalty effect driving the choice of parties' platforms during elections. There emerges a non-linear relationship between these variable, whereby a party sticking to its historical heritage may lose to a rival more keen to...

I discuss a scenario in which second expert opinions may not benefit decision making. The introduction of a second expert s the possibility of partisan bickering, which impairs information transmission.

We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which is the converse of reduction-consistency introduced by Yeh (2006), and study its implications. Our results are...

This note shows that in an incomplete information situation the closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets if and only if the set of states of the society which all agents believeoccur with positive probability satisfies the `connection' condition.It then follows from...

We analyze simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong. We study coaltion formation rules that associate to each profile of agents''...

This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous,...

The siting of noxious facilities is usually a reason for conflict: as a society we want them, but as individuals (and often as communities) we do not want them close by. Faced with this problem economists have used several methods such as lotteries, auctions or insurance policies. However, all...

This paper offers a solution to King Solomon's problem of allocating an indivisible "prize" to two agents. We add time dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation. The implementation is imminent: the mechanism...